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CITY PERMIT REVOCATION IN WAKE OF RIOT:
SOME CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
On July 27, 1970, a free rock music concert starring Sly and the
Family Stone and sponsored by the Chicago Park District in down-
town Grant Park erupted into a five-hour riot that spread into the
Chicago Loop area and caused extensive personal and property in-
juries.' The following day, the Chicago Park District's Board of
Commissioners unanimously adopted a resolution revoking the permit
agreements for the remaining six rock concerts scheduled to be held
in public facilities that year, citing a "'dear and present danger to
the health and safety of the citizens of the City of Chicago."'2 Five
of the concerts, like the one that precipitated the riot, were to be
free outdoor events sponsored by the Park District. 3 But the sixth
concert, scheduled for September 13, 1970, was to be a paid-admissions
1. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1970, at 1, col. 7. The trouble began when members
of the audience swarmed over the Grant Park Band Shell stage. The police
moved in to clear the stage in order for the concert to continue. Suddenly,
rocks and bottles were thrown at the police, beginning a riot which led to
window smashing and some looting in downtown stores. There were approximately
5,000 rioters, both white and black, most of them young people. Id.
162 people were injured, including 126 policemen; 160 people were arrested.
35-50,000 people attended the concert, and according to the Park District Presi-
dent, 400 people started the riot, some of them having come to the park with
chains and baseball bats. But some policemen said it was "spontaneous, touched
off by beer and wine drinking, heat, the size of the crowd and a report that Sly
and the Family Stone, a rock group, would not perform as scheduled." N.Y.
Times, July 29, 1970, at 24, col. 1. Property damage was estimated at $80,000.
Sly was not scheduled to appear until 6:30 p.m. A local band was performing
when the riot broke out at 4 p.m. Id.
2. Contemporary Music Group, Inc. v. Chicago Park Dist., 343 F. Supp. 505
(N.D. Ill. 1972). The court went on to say: "The resolution also stated that
numerous public statements and threats had been made by rioters and other
persons at the scene at the time of and immediately following the disturbance,
asserting that the rioting was part of a continuing plan to seek a violent con-
frontation with police officers and officials of the City of Chicago, and that said
conduct would be repeated in the future. On the basis of these alleged facts,
the Board of Commissioners of the Park District found 'that a continuation or
repetition of a contemporary music concert at or near the Grant Park Band Shell
will present a clear and present danger to the health and safety of the citizens of
the City of Chicago.. . ' " Id. at 507.
3. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1970, at 24, col. 1.
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concert in Soldier Field Stadium sponsored by the nonprofit Contem-
porary Music Group, Inc.
In Contemporary Music Group, Inc. v. Chicago Park District4
plaintiff, suing mainly for lost profits in the alleged amount of
$1,500,000, claimed that the permit revocation not only was a breach
of contract by the Park District but was also an unconstitutional in-
fringement of its right to contract,5 as well as a deprivation of prop-
erty without due process of law.6 In addition, plaintiff claimed the
ban against rock concerts violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment,7 the Civil Rights Act of 1871,s and the right
of free speech and expression. 9 The federal district court dismissed
the complaint for lack of a federal question, o holding the contracts
clause inapplicable when an action for damages for a possible breach
of contract can be maintained at the state court level."1 The court
dismissed outright the personal rights allegations.12
The doctrine is well-settled that a municipal ordinance has the
effect of a state law for purposes of the contracts clause.13 Yet the
4. 343 F. Supp. 505 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
6. 343 F. Supp. at 508.
7. Id. at 509.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti.
tution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
9. The Chicago Park District is a municipal corporation (343 F. Supp. at 507),
and therefore its action is "state action" for purposes of the fourteenth amendment.
The fourteenth amendment has been interpreted to protect first amendment
rights.
10. The court held federal jurisdiction was lacking because no federal ques-
tion was found. No claim based on diversity of citizenship was made. 343 F.
Supp. at 507.
11. Id. at 508.
12. Id. at 509-10.
13. White, 0.J., wrote, "It is no longer open to question that 'a by-law or
ordinance of a municipal corporation may be such an exercise of legislative power
delegated by the legislature to the corporation as a political subdivision of the
State, having all the force of law within the limits of the municipality, that it
may properly be considered as a law, within the meaning of the article [art. I,
§ 10] of the Constitution of the United States.'" St. Paul Gaslight Co. v. City
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol7/iss1/31
CITY PERMIT REVOCATIONS
Supreme Court has often been reluctant to use that doctrine in ac-
tually finding municipal impairments of contracts. At the turn of
the century, when the landscape of American cities was rapidly
changing, a host of cases came before the federal courts involving
municipalities revoking their contracts with private companies in
order to provide more modern public services. In cases dealing with
waterworks,14 viaduct repairs, 5 sewer systems,16 and street paving,
1 7
the Court found nothing more than a "naked case of breach of con-
tract,"' 8 an issue for the state, not federal, courts.
The leading case in this field is St. Paul Gaslight Co. v. City of
St. Paul19 in which plaintiff had contracted with the city to supply
its gas street lamps. The city subsequently began installing new elec-
tric lamps and passed an ordinance that required the company to
remove the gas lamps standing in electric neighborhoods and allowed
for the city's nonpayment of the interest on the cost of the unused
gas lamps. Suing for the interest as promised in the charter granted
by the city, the company based its claim of federal jurisdiction on the
contracts clause of the United States Constitution.20 The Court found
of St. Paul, 181 U.S. 142, 148 (1901). See also Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. City
of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 555 (1914); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 163
(1913); Grand Trunk W. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 221 U.S. 400, 403 (1911);
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Minnesota ex tel. City of Duluth, 208 U.S. 583, 590 (1908);
Hamilton Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Hamilton City, 146 U.S. 258, 266 (1892); New
Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Co., 125 U.S. 18, 31 (1888).
14. City of Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Saving Fund, Safe Deposit, Title &
Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178 (1905). The mortgagee of a waterworks company sued
to enforce the city's contract to pay the company, the city refusing after decid-
ing by ordinance to build its own waterworks. The Court reversed and remanded
to the federal circuit court with instructions to dismiss for want of diversity
jurisdiction; but Holmes, J., speaking for the Court, added, "We repeat that
something more than a mere refusal of a municipal corporation to perform its
contract is necessary to make a law impairing the obligation of contracts or
otherwise to give rise to a suit under the Constitution of the United States." Id.
at 182. Contra, Mercantile Trust Co. v. City of Columbus, 203 U.S. 311 (1906);
Knoxville Water Co. v. City of Knoxville, 200 U.S. 22 (1906); Vicksburg Water-
works Co. v. City of Vicksburg, 185 U.S. 65 (1902); Walla Walla City v.
Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1 (1898).
15. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Minnesota ex rel. City of Duluth, 208 U.S. 583 (1908).
16. Shawnee Sewerage & Drainage Co. v. Steams, 220 U.S. 462 (1911).
17. McCormick v. Oklahoma City, 236 U.S. 657 (1915).
18. City of Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Saving Fund, Safe Deposit, Title &
Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178, 181 (1905).
19. 181 U.S. 142 (1901).
20. 343 F. Supp. at 507-08.
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no impairment and dismissed plaintiff's appeal for want of federal
jurisdiction, explaining:
This amounts only to the contention that every case involving a
controversy concerning a municipal contract is one of Federal
cognizance, determinable ultimately in this court. Thus to re-
duce the proposition to its ultimate conception is to demonstrate
its error.2'
For the same reason, the Court has disposed of the companion "dep-
rivation of property without due process of law" argument with the
observation that it, too, is simply a matter for possible state remedial
action.2
2
Although distinguishing an "impairment" of right from a simple
"breach" is not always easy,23 the court in the principal case found
no impairment of the contract right nor any deprivation of property
without due process because Music Group retained its remedy in a
state action to compel full performance. 24 The court then carried its
reasoning a step further by relying on National Cold Storage Co. v.
Port of New York Authority,25 holding that the Board's anti-rock
concert resolution could not be a "law" under the contracts clause
because the resolution only applied to a particular situation for a
limited time and "did not possess the characteristics of a law of gen-
eral application." 2 In other words, the Board's response to the July
21. 181 U.S. at 149. See Manila Inv. Co. v. Trammell, 239 U.S. 31 (1915).
Contra, Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co. v. Ohio, 245 U.S. 574 (1918);
Iron Mountain Ry. v. City of Memphis, 96 F. 113 (6th Cir. 1899).
22. Hays v. Port of Seattle, 251 U.S. 233 (1920). After dispensing with the
contracts clause argument of plaintiff, the Court went on to say, "Assuming he
had property rights and that they were taken, it clearly was done for a public
service, and there was adequate provision for compensation . . . ." by maintain-
ing a state court action for his remedy; that satisfies due process. Id. at 238. See
Manila Inv. Co. v. Trammell, 239 U.S. 31 (1915); McCormick v. Oklahoma
City, 236 U.S. 657 (1915); City of Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Saving Fund,
Safe Deposit, Title & Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178 (1905).
23. Holmes, J., suggests one difference is that a state law passed expressly
authorizing a city to do what the city has already authorized someone else to
do would be an impairment, while if no legislative act is passed subsequent to
the contract and there is no showing that the city is acting under color of a
state law, that would be a breach. City of Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Saving
Fund, Safe Deposit, Title & Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1905).
24. 343 F. Supp. at 508.
25. 286 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
26. 343 F. Supp. at 508.
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riot in this instance was administrative, not legislative,27 and there-
fore was not cloaked within the federal purview of the contracts
clause. 8s
The Board's legal justification for revoking the concert permit in
the court's opinion was the Board's inherent right to exercise its
police power when threatened with the "clear and present danger"
of future violence at rock concerts. 29 The court essentially posed the
issue of the case: can a municipal corporation revoke a permit in the
light of a clear and present danger to the city? The court held that
it could. A problem arises, however, when the issue is turned around
to read: was there a clear and present danger sufficient to warrant
revoking the permit for Music Group's September 13th concert? The
Supreme Court has held that danger of riot or public disorder must
be immediate to justify any state incursion into the protected free-
doms of the first and fourteenth amendments20 Music Group's con-
27. In National Cold Storage Co. v. Port of N.Y. Authority, 286 F. Supp.
1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the court found that the resolutions of the Board of
Commissioners of the New York Port Authority were not laws "within the
framework of the contracts clause" because they were "merely the method by
which a body corporate bestirs itself to action in the conduct of its affairs as a
functioning entity." Id. at 1018. See Washington v. Maricopa County, 152 F.2d
556 (9th Cir. 1945), which held that resolutions of county supervisors and state
loan commissioners were not legislative but administrative in character.
28. A persistent theme running throughout this entire line of contracts cases
is that the federal courts are the wrong forums in which to bring most of these
actions. "To hold that this court has jurisdiction would be, in effect, to hold
that whenever a state ... agency is alleged to have breached ... an innumerable
range of possible contracts, the federal court has jurisdiction. Such a holding
would be a massive interference with the principles of federalism by making the
federal court the primary forum . . . ." 286 F. Supp. at 1018. See Brody v.
McCoy, 257 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1966): "If plaintiffs were correct, there
would be a wide door to the federal courts, through the 'contract' clause of all
things, for the litigation of obviously and peculiarly state questions." Id. at 213.
29. It is a well-settled rule that the state's police power supersedes any con-
tract. "[Tihe right to exercise the police power is a continuing one; that it cannot
be contracted away, and that a requirement that a company, or individual com-
ply with reasonable police regulations without compensation is the legitimate
exercise of the power and not in violation of the constitutional inhibition against
the impairment of the obligation of contracts." Northern Pac. Ry. v. Minnesota
ex rel. City of Duluth, 208 U.S. 583, 596 (1908); see, e.g., New York & New
England R.R. v. Bristol, 151 U.S. 556, 567 (1894); Budd v. New York, 143 U.S.
517, 544 (1892); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 659 (1887).
30. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic
upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace,
or order, appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious.
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cert was to occur seven weeks after the riot, and it was the only
cancelled concert not sponsored by the Park District and not open
to a free audience. Music Group contended its civil and personal
rights had been violated, in addition to its property rights, and there-
fore sued the individual park commissioners31 under the Civil Rights
Act of 1871,32 the fourteenth amendment, and the first amendment.
Justice Stone, in his famous concurring opinion in Hague v. CIO aa
explained that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 applies to personal, not
property, rights.34 In a recent, well-reasoned case, Judge Friendly held
that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was inapplicable when alleging the
mere loss of money.35 Because Music Group's sole remedy for which
it sued was 51,500,000 (primarily lost profits), the court in the prin-
Equally obvious is it that a State may not unduly suppress free communica-
tion of views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving desirable
conditions.
Id. at 308. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 544-52 (1965); Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951); Terminiello
v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242,
255 (1937); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
31. A municipal corporation is not a "person" within the meaning of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1983); thus, no cause of action can be
maintained against a city; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-192 (1961);
Egan v. City of Aurora, 365 U.S. 514 (1961). A corporation is, however, a
"person" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment equal protection and
due process clauses; see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963); Gros-
jean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
33. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
34. Id. at 531. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) (§ 1983's implementation provision)
applies "whenever the right or immunity is one of personal liberty, not depend-
ent for its existence upon the infringement of property rights." Id. See Holt v.
Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U.S. 68 (1900); McManigal v. Simon, 382 F.2d 408
(7th Cir. 1967); Ream v. Handley, 359 F.2d 728 (7th Cir. 1966).
35. Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969). Judge Friendly wrote:
"So far as our research has disclosed, Mr. Justice Stone's definition would en-
compass all the cases in which the Supreme Court has sustained jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), with the possible exception of King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309 (1968)." Friendly goes on to say that King could arguably fit under
Stone's definition (King struck down Alabama's "substitute father" regulation
which denied payments to some welfare families). 421 F.2d at 564. Since Music
Group, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the distinction between per-
sonal and property rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, thus rendering
the district court's argument on this point moot. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp.,
405 U.S. 538 (1972).
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cipal case dismissed the Civil Rights Act claim, as well as the equal
protection argument.36
Plaintiff's claim based on the first amendment was not as easily
disposed of as was the civil rights claim. The Supreme Court in
Winters v. New York laid down the broad proposition that the first
amendment protects entertainment.37 Only libel, obscenity, "fighting
words,"-8 and expressions posing a dear and present danger 39 to
public safety have not been given first amendment protection. Plays,40
films, 4 1 topless dancing,42 burlesque shows, 43 and live sexual enter-
tainment- have all been held to be forms of speech and expression
within the scope of the first amendment.
East Meadow Community Concerts Association v. Board of Educa-
tion15 is a case closer to point. Folksinger Pete Seeger had been sched-
36. The court dismissed the fourteenth amendment equal protection argu-
ment that the Park District had shown "invidious discrimination" in singling
nut rock music concerts in its resolution by merely citing Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) and Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter,
384 U.S. 35, 50 (1966). See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Morey
v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463 (1957); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942).
37. 333 U.S. 507 (1948). "We do not accede to appellee's suggestion that
the constitutional protection for a free press applies only to the exposition of ideas.
The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protec-
tion of that basic right. Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda
through fiction. What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine." Id.
at 510.
38. Cbaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); see, e.g., Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483, 492 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
39. See note 30 supra.
40. See, e.g., Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970); Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967). For cases protecting the free expression of the rock
musical Hair see Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 457 F.2d
340 (5th Cir. 1972); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F.
Supp. 634 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Charlotte,
333 F. Supp. 345 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
41. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Kingsley Pictures
Corp. v. Regents of S.U.N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wil-
son, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); United States v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "I
Am Curious-Yellow," 404 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1968).
42. In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968).
43. Hudson v. United States, 234 A.2d 903 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1967);
Adams Theatre Co. v. Keenan, 12 N.J. 267, 96 A.2d 519 (1953).
44. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
45. 18 N.Y.2d 129, 219 N.E.2d 172, 272 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1966).
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uled to perform in a public school auditorium. Because of Seeger's
controversial political views and actions, the permit granted to the
nonprofit association sponsoring the concert was withdrawn three
months before the concert date with the explanation that Seeger's
presence might provoke a disturbance. The New York Court of
Appeals granted Community Concerts a declaratory judgment, find-
ing that although the action was now moot, because the concert
date had passed, the constitutional issues raised were too important
to overlook, and this type of situation could arise again. The court
held:
Consequently, if there were no danger of immediate and irrepar-
able injury to the public weal, the defendant's refusal to permit
Seeger to appear at the March 12 concert would be an unlawful
restriction of the constitutional right of free speech and ex-
pression.46
Cases prohibiting the prior restraint of free speech are numerous.47
The court in Music Group misread Community Concerts when it
said that case has no application here.48 Denying Music Group's right
to put on a concert because its permit application said nothing about
seeking a platform for anything but rock music- presupposes that to
exercise one's first amendment rights, prior notice must be given to
prevent forfeiture of those rights. This conclusion is certainly illog-
ical, and Community Concerts maintains precisely the opposite: that
the right of free expression exists independent of any governmental
action. Seeger's right to perform had nothing to do with whether or
not the association's permit expressly said he was going to exercise
that right. And that is equally true in Music Group. With no find-
ing of a clear and present danger to Chicago seven weeks after the
riot, the court's statement that free speech cannot be deprived by
the "good faith exercise of the police power"5 0 cannot be, and is not,
explained.
46. Id. at 134, 219 N.E.2d at 175, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 345 (emphasis added).
47. See, e.g., Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175
(1968); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Lovell v. City of
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697
(1931); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).





Yet Music Group's holding that plaintiff has no federal case is
justified. The Park District impaired no contract right by revoking
the permit because Music Group had a clear case of breach of con-
tract in a state action. Music Group, however, buttressed its weak
contracts clause contention with the strong first amendment argu-
ment that no clear and present danger existed to occasion banning
a far-off concert. The case was thus cast in terms of property and
personal rights. Because Music Group sued for lost profits after the
concert date, and not for an injunction and declaratory judgment
before the concert date, which would have been Music Group's proper
relief, the property rights argument was clearly the point and sub-
stance of the complaint.
Despite the unquestionable authority of a municipal corporation
to exercise its revoking power, a more perplexing question still re-
mains-at what point can that power be exercised without violating
one of the constitutional guarantees? Music Group, by confusing that
question with the issue of municipal authority, merely reaffirms the
constant dilemma between the need for appropriate municipal re-
sponse to a possibly inflammatory situation and the danger of munic-
ipal power encroaching upon vital constitutional rights.
Gus Bauman
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